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The dilemma efficiency versus equity, together with political partisan interests, has received 
increasing attention to explain the territorial allocation of investments. However, centralization 
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of now of empirical analysis. Our main contribution to the literature is providing evidence that 
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investment programs are influenced by the centralization strategy of investing near to the 
political capital, while investment effort in no-network modes (airports and ports) appears to be 
positively related to distance. Since investment in surface transportation infrastructures is much 
higher than that in airports and ports, and taken into account that regions surrounding the 
political capital are poorer than the average, we suggest that centralization rather than 
redistribution has been the driver for the concentration of public investment on these regions. 
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Introduction  
The economic literature has given increasing attention to the analysis of the factors that explain 
the regional allocation of public investment in infrastructure (Yamano and Ohkawara, 2000; de 
la Fuente, 2005; Kemmerling and Stephan, 2002 and 2010; Knight, 2004; Castells and Solé-
Ollé, 2005; Bel and Fageda, 2009; Solé-Ollé, 2010). Research in this field has heavily focused 
in the dilemma efficiency versus equity, together with political partisan interests, to explain the 
territorial allocation of investments.  
However, focusing only on this dilemma might cause overlooking of one of the possible 
potential objectives that policy of transportation infrastructures and services can seek: 
determining the patterns of political power and territorial administrative hierarchization. In an 
interesting paper, Faguet (2004) tries to explain why there is so much centralization. His model 
locates central government in a particular geographical space, the capital, and considers self-
interest on the part of the capital residents. According to Faguet’s analysis, centralization is a 
consequence of the interest of those who live in the capital city. In this way, they benefit directly 
from a strongly centralized government within a context where territorial governments enjoy 
weak constitutional guarantees.  
The using of infrastructure policy to foster centralization has been analyzed in the economic 
history literature for the Australian case (for instance Wotherspoon (1979), Docwra and Kolsen 
(1989), and Gray (2009) and the Spanish case (Bel, 2010). However, as far as we know the 
literature lacks robust empirical evidence on this hypothesis. We believe this approach can help 
to understand why infrastructure investment is allocated by the central government. This can 
add to the analysis based on the efficiency-equity dilemma and its extension by considering 
political factors.  
Our main contribution to the literature is providing evidence that meta-political objectives 
related to the ordering of political power and administration influence regional investment. 
Spain proves to be an interesting field to check whether policies aimed to administrative and 
political centralization have influenced the regional allocation of investment. The main results 
from our empirical analysis show that investment programs in network modes (roads and 
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railways) is negatively related to the distance to the capital city; thus, they are influenced by the 
centralization strategy of investing near to the political capital. On the contrary, while 
investment effort in no-network modes (airports and –of course- ports) appears to be positively 
related to distance. Investment in surface transportation infrastructures is much higher than that 
in airports and ports. Given that regions surrounding the political capital are relatively poorer, 
this suggest that centralization rather than redistribution has been the main driver for the 
concentration of public investment on these regions. 
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. First we review the related literature. 
Next we explain our empirical strategy. Then we present our results, and discuss their main 
implications. Finally, we draw our main conclusions.  
 
Literature review 
The economic literature has given increasing attention to the analysis of the factors that explain 
the regional allocation of public investment in infrastructure. Early works in this literature, such 
as Yamano and Ohkawara (2000) and de la Fuente (2005), focused on the efficiency-equity 
traditional trade-off. Other works, while still paying attention to the trade-off between efficiency 
and equity, extend the analysis to include the role of political factors as determinants of 
government investment in infrastructure.  
In this way, Kemmerling and Stephan (2002) show that –together with equity motivations- 
the distribution of investment grants among cities is positively related to the political support the 
incumbent party enjoys in each city. In the same way, Knight (2004) analyzes the US 
Congressional votes over transportation projects funding, and finds that the probability of 
supporting the projects is increasing in own-district spending.  
On their side, Castells and Solé (2005) find that political considerations matter, since 
governments invests more in the regions where electoral productivity is higher. More recently, 
Bel and Fageda (2009) find that regional investment in airports in Spain is positively related to 
the electoral support to the incumbent party in the national government, and it is positively 
related as well to the party alignment between the national government and the regional 
government (that is to say, both of them belong to the same political party).  
Following this stream of the literature, Kemmerling and Stephan (2009) emphasize the 
importance of country-specific political institutions in order to explain the regional distribution 
of investments. To analyze this issue, the authors undertake a cross-country empirical analysis, 
considering France, Germany, Italy and Spain. This set of countries includes Federal (Germany 
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and Spain) as well as Unitarian (France and Italy) countries, as well as a variety of electoral 
systems. 
Kemmerling and Stephan (2009) distinguish between (1) normative factors -efficiency, 
redistribution and equity-, noting that efficiency and redistribution are usually conflicting 
objectives; and (2) political factors, within which they emphasize the ideological stance of 
political parties (assuming left-wing and regionalist/separatist parties positively related with 
investment in the region), partisanship (those regions where the governmental party is the same 
as the party in the national government receive more investment), and (3) electoral interest of 
the national government (higher investment in pivotal regions and in party’s strongholds). 
The results obtained from the empirical estimation suggest that efficiency concerns are 
important in all countries, and redistribution is an important objective in all countries as well 
(although not statistically significant for France). However, the equity objective shows more 
ambiguous results, and no strong conclusion can be made about it. Regarding political variables, 
the results are much more mixed, and show important differences between countries. In this 
way, partisan strongholds receive more investment in Spain and Italy, but this does not happen 
in Germany and France. Regional parties are positively related to regional investment in Spain, 
but they are not so in Italy. Regarding left parties, they are related to higher regional investment 
in Italy and France, but they are not so in Germany and Spain. All in all, there exists a wide 
diversity regarding the effects of political variables, and two general results are emphasized by 
the authors: (a) ideological variables only play a significant role in centralized systems, and (b) 
electoral incentives play a role in most countries. 
Solé-Ollé (2009) analyzes why “fiscal deficits” related to infrastructure are subject to harsh 
discussions. First, because infrastructure related fiscal deficits sustained overtime lead to too 
small infrastructure capital stocks in rich regions; second, because the central government has 
considerable discretion in the territorial allocation of infrastructure investments; and third, 
because it is not clear what ‘objective criteria’ of infrastructure investment allocation means. Of 
course, there is an important distinction to keep in mind in order to interpret the concepts. On 
one hand, we can think of the existence of tactical redistribution, usually called pork barrel 
politics. On the other hand, we can consider the existence of programmatic redistribution, based 
on the citizen-candidate approach. Here what matters is that preferences on how to organize 
society influence as well political decisions. 
Solé-Ollé (2009) uses data on investment and capital stock at the province level data for 
1978 through 2004. Data for 1964-1977, before the democracy was reestablished in Spain, is 
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considered too in the study, but is not included in the analysis for the political variables. The 
author includes four political variables in his empirical model; (1) Margin, deriving from the 
swing voter theory; (2) Votes/seats, related to maximizing effectiveness of money invested to 
‘buy’ votes;  (3) Aligned governments, that is to say, Do your comrades rule the region?; and (4)  
Pivotal: indicating whether the central government needs support from regional specific parties. 
Regarding the results obtained from the estimations, all these variables work reasonably well, 
although results for alignment are mixed: alignment is usually significant for Social-democrat –
PSOE- governments, but it is not for Conservative –PP- governments. 
Overall, Solé-Ollé’s results suggest that regional allocation of infrastructure investment in 
Spain is heavily affected by politics, both by tactical redistribution as well as by programmatic 
redistribution. It is worth emphasizing the specific results obtained regarding the two reasons 
explaining why a region would obtain less investment than deserved: a) being a region with low 
political power, and b) belonging to a group (according to the region’s characteristics) that 
enjoys low political power. 
The analysis of Solé-Ollé (2009) results seem to be particularly consistent, perhaps 
reflecting the fact that single-country studies usually allow using a wide set of variables. 
Undoubtedly, his estimation benefits from this.  
One interesting question that can relate to previous studies is that of how to approach the 
efficiency criteria. On one way, relating regional output to the regional infrastructure stock 
seems a sensible way to approach the issue in an aggregated way. However, this type of analysis 
could benefit from using a more detailed and disaggregated analysis. Rich regions do not always 
have high project impact, and poor regions do not always have low project impact. It crucially 
depends on the previous stock of a given type of infrastructure. For instance, Spanish 
motorways plan 1984-1991 emphasized investment where high capacity roads were absent. It 
was likely following an efficiency criterion. Technically, what really matters in not whether a 
region is rich or poor, but the traffic intensity (e.g. average daily traffic) adjusted for the existing 
motorway capacity (current level of service).  
More importantly, a further distinction that could be useful to take into account is that 
distinguishing between budged funded infrastructures and user funded infrastructures. The first 
one is the case of railway infrastructure in all countries, and most motorways in Spain and 
(almost all) in Germany. However, most motorways in France and Italy are tolled (as well as a 
non negligible part –roughly the 25%- of the motorway network in Spain). Generally, airports 
and ports are funded with users’ charges (even if some cross subsidies are allowed in the 
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different countries). It is quite possible that national government will use different criteria on the 
regional allocation of specific infrastructure investment depending on how the investment is 
going to be funded. Basically, redistribution and political objectives would likely have more 
room in budged funded infrastructures than in infrastructures that are paid for by the users. 
Therefore, disaggregated analysis, distinguishing by infrastructure type could provide interesting 
and more robust results. 
As we mention above, Faguet (2004) tries to explain the centralization hypothesis. In this 
paper, we take Spain as a field to check this hypothesis. We argue that our approach can help to 
understand why infrastructure investment is allocated by the central government. This can add 
to the analysis based on the efficiency-equity dilemma and its extension by considering political 
factors.  
The empirical analysis 
- Data and variables 
First, we describe the variables used in the empirical analysis and explain the sources of this 
information. We have data for 51 provinces (“provincias”) in the period that goes from 1981 to 
2005.1 To this regard, data for each variable is obtained at the level of each Spanish province. 
Overall, we have about 1275 observations. Next we present and describe our main variables: 
Dependent variable 
We are interested in finding determinants of investment efforts realized by central government 
during the period studied. Therefore, we use as dependent variable the ratio of gross investment 
in transportation infrastructure by the central government (I) over the gross stock of capital in 
transportation infrastructure in the previous period (kt-1). Information for these variables has 
been obtained from the website of FBBA-IVIE. Data is expressed in thousands of current euros 
and is available for each transportation mode: roads, railways, airports and ports.  
Regressors and instruments 
1. Distance from the city center of the capital of each region to the city center of Madrid 
(Distance_capital). Data for this variable has been computed using the algorithm of google 
maps where we account for the shortest distance in kilometers by road. This variable measures 
the centralization objective of central government. 
                                                 
1 The only province not considered in our sample is Ceuta- an autonomous city of Spain located on the 
north African side of the strait of Gibraltar- due to lack of information for several variables. 
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2. Gross domestic product per capita (GDP_per_capita). Information for this variable has 
been obtained from the Spanish Statistics Institute (INE). Data is expressed in thousands of 
current euros. This variable captures economic wealth and as a consequence measures the 
redistribution objective of central government through infrastructure investment effort. Related 
to GDP, we also use the mean number of schooling years of active population (edu), which 
serves as one of the instruments used to predict current GDP in our effort to overcome 
endogeneity problems. Information for this variable has been obtained from the website of 
FBBA-IVIE.   
3. Percentatge of votes of the incumbent party in the central government in the elections to 
the central parliament across regions (votes). Information for this variable has been obtained 
from the website of Ministry of domestic affairs. This variable captures political opportunistic 
behavior of the incumbent party in central government. 
4. Population (Pop). Information for this variable has been obtained from the Spanish 
Statistics Institute (INE). Data is expressed in terms of total number of inhabitants. This is a 
measure of mobility needs.  
5. Land area of the province (Land). Information for this variable has been obtained from the 
Spanish Statistics Institute (INE).  Data is expressed in terms of square kilometers. This is a 
variable accounting for mobility needs as well. 
 
- The estimation strategy 
Given our cross section time series data we have performed different estimations to test our 
main hypotheses. First, we regress total investments on several groups of determinants (Model 
1), in which we consider political objectives of redistribution, centralization and electoral 
opportunism – our policy regressors-, as well as we include other control variables. The 
centralization objective is determined by the use of the distance from the capital city to the 
province receiving investments as a covariate. Therefore, we expect a negative relationship 
between the variable Distance to the capital and total investment effort in order to confirm our 
hypothesis. Similarly, a negative correlation between GDP per capita and total investment effort 
would mean that redistribution is considered when designing total investments programs. Since 
the literature also supports that governments – or the incumbent party - tend to favor political 
communities where they receive more electoral votes, we introduce this opportunistic behavior 
by including the variable Votes in the model. In this regard, we expect a positive relationship 
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between the percentatge of votes of the incumbent party in the central governments and the 
amount of investments in the corresponding province.  
Among control variables we can distinguish three groups of regressors. The first group is 
formed by covariates capturing mobility needs as population (Pop) and land area (Land), while 
the second group of regressors control for investment inertia and previous capital stock as 
determinants of current investments. To this regard, the variables introduced are the first lag of 
total investment efforts  (iit-1total) and the first lag of capital stock per capita (kit-1total). The last 
group of regressors contain in the first place a dummy variable (Dforal) denoting with value 1 the 
provinces that hold responsibilities – due to political decentralization –on network modes as 
roads and rail transportation and 0 otherwise. Secondly, we add the time trend to take into 
account the time dimension of our data. 
Regarding expected relationships of the control variables, we expect investment efforts being 
positively associated with mobility needs but mixed - or at least not clear- effects with the 
second group of regressors. In fact, government investment programs tend to cover more than 
one year, what implies an inertia that should appear positively correlated with current total 
investments. However, there are less investment needs in regions where investment effort has 
increased during the last years covering recent needs of better or new infrastructure. A similar 
uncertainty can be attributed to past capital stock. Indeed, regions with more capital stock 
present lower needs of public investment but it is also reasonable to consider that once you have 
an infrastructure you need to maintain and renew the stock. Following this argument we could 
expect a positive relationship between the lag of capital stock and current investments. Being 
this said, recent literature support a negative correlation between investment efforts and previous 
capital stock in Spain (Sole-Ollé, 2009) 
Finally, as the remaining control regressor, the binary variable (Dforal) should produce negative 
impacts on central government investments in the modes that are under the responsibility of 
regional governments. Therefore, since those modes are network modes, which account for most 
central government investments, it is straightforward to expect this negative relationship.  
Next we present the specification of Model 1: 
 
Model 1: iittotal = α +β1Distance_capitali + β2GDP_per_capitait + β3Votesit + β4Popit + β5Landi + 
β6iit-1total + β7kit-1total + β8Dforal + β9Time_trend + ε  
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Although we test our hypothesis on the political objectives undertaken by Spanish central 
governments in their design of investment programs, recall that we are also interested in 
distinguishing statistical impacts by transportation mode in order to show that only considering 
total investments can lead us to a misinterpretation of results. For this reason it is desirable to 
replicate the estimation strategy differentiating between network modes (roads, rails) and no-
network modes (airports, ports) as Model 2 and Model 3 do. This difference will account for the 
different characteristics of network and no-network infrastructure. Indeed, network 
infrastructure constraints the ability to extent the transportation stock, a limitation not suffered 
by no-network infrastructure. As a consequence, investments’ regional distribution should be 
affected and restricted by the existing network only in the case of network modes. This means 
that we expect a stronger relationship between investment efforts and existing capital stock in 
the case of network infrastructure. The different two aggregated models by mode are presented 
below: 
 
Model 2: iitnetwork = α +β1Distance_capitali + β2GDP_per_capitait + β3Votesit + β4Popit + β5Landi 
+ β6iit-1network + β7kit-1network + β8Dforal + β9Time_trend + ε  
 
Model 3: iitno-network = α +β1Distance_capitali + β2GDP_per_capitait + β3Votesit + β4Popit 
+β5Landi + β6iit-1no-network+ β7kit-1no-network + β8Disland + β9Time_trend + ε  
 
As the reader will observe, the no-network investment effort equation includes a variable not 
included in the network investment effort equation. This covariate is a dummy variable that 
identifies with 1 those provinces being an Island (Disland) and 0 otherwise. This binary variable is 
considered necessary to account for investments of point-to-point transportation infrastructures 
as ports and airports. These provinces (islands) are not linked to the rest of the network 
infrastructure due to obvious reasons. In this regard, the estimation that uses as dependent 
variable the aggregate investment and the investment in network modes exclude from the 
sample those provinces located on islands. Our main goal is to distinguish between different 
policy objectives of the central government and including islands in the estimations that 
consider network modes could distort results of the variable for the distance to the capital.   
If differences between network and no-network infrastructure can lead to information losses or 
misinterpretation by mixing together, it is also interesting to replicate the same empirical 
strategy for each transportation mode to further investigate investment policy heterogeneity. 
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This excercise, based on models 4-7, which models only consider each mode’s investment effort 
separately - road, rail, airports and ports, respectively- is presented in the appendix, as well as 
their associated main results. 
It is worth mentioning that the only difference between Model 4 and the basic Model 2 for 
network investments is the introduction of private investments in the road mode equation. These 
investments are carried out by private toll motorway companies and therefore we expect lower 
investment efforts where there is private investment acting as substitute of public stocks. 
 
- Estimation and results 
Next we present the results of the estimation of the total investment effort equation (Model 
1). First of all, table 1 and table 2 show the descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix of 
the main variables used in the empirical analysis. From these tables, we can see that all variables 
have enough variability and multicollineality between regressors does not seem to be a 
problem.2  
Insert table 1 about here 
Insert table 2 about here 
We estimate the investment equations using the Two-Stage Least Square estimator (2SLS-
IV) because the variable of GDP per capita may be endogenous. Indeed, we suspect that the 
level of investments and income in a province are determined simultaneously. More investments 
in transport infrastructure should produce a substantial economic impact in the province that 
take benefit from those investments. As instruments of the GDP per capita, we use the first lag 
of the GDP per capita and the mean number of schooling years in each province as a proxy of 
the level of education. Note that the Hansen test and the test of significance of the instruments 
do not reject the null hypotheses that the instruments are exogenous and strongly correlated with 
the instrumented variables (See table 3). Thus, these tests provide evidence of the validity of the 
instruments.  
Note also that we compute standard errors robust to any bias from heteroskedasticity. 
Additionally, we adjust our estimates by clustering observations from the same region to 
account for the possible correlation between observations (provinces) from the same region 
(“Comunidad Autónoma”). 
                                                 
2 The only exception is the high correlation between GDP per capita and the stock of capital. As we will see below, 
this high correlation does not distort the individual interpretation of results for these variables.  
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Our estimation procedure does not take into account the panel data nature of the sample. The 
use of a fixed-effects model is not appropriate in our context since this technique drops anything 
that is time-invariant from the model, such as the distance to Madrid or being an island. A 
random-effects model is not appropriate because the individual effects related to provinces are 
likely correlated with the error term, as indicated by the Hausman test. Finally, the Hausman-
Taylor estimator is not appropriate either since it assumes that all explanatory variables are 
exogenous. 
Tables 3 displays the results of the estimates of the investment effort equations. We first 
estimate the total investment equation considering all transportation modes and then we 
differentiate between network modes (roads, railways) and no network modes (airports, ports) as 
described in the previous section. The resuls of the estimates of these specifications are 
indicated in table 3. In table A1, in the appendix, we also show the results of the estimates of 
the investment effort equations for each transportation mode. Recall that a major point in our 
analysis is to identify differences between investment patterns in network and no-network 
modes.  
Insert table 3 about here 
Results for total investments (Model 1) provide the expected relationships - with the only 
exception of GDP per capita, which appears positively related to total investments per capita- 
and shows a good fit of the model (R2 = 0.56; F-test = 772.51***). In fact, our results confirm 
the centralization hypothesis by finding a negative and highly statistically significant impact of 
the coefficient associated with the distance to the political capital. Regions close to Madrid seem 
to receive more investment efforts than regions far from it. On the contrary, the redistribution 
objective accounted by the GDP per capita variable does not seem to play a significant role in 
central government investment programs. Indeed, we find a statistically significant relationship 
of its coefficient that implies more investment efforts in rich provinces and less efforts in poor 
regions. Being the first two policy variables statistically significant, the number of electoral 
votes received in a given province by the incumbent party ruling central government does not 
seem to drive total investment plans, at least when we consider all modes from an aggregate 
point of view.  
Regarding mobility needs as investment determinants we find disappointing effects by not 
being any of the variables used – population and land area – statistically significant at 10%, 
although they present a positive impact on the dependent variable and land area’s coefficient 
appears to be significant at 15%. More significant are the variables accounting for investment 
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inertia and existing capital stock. On one hand, the lag of total investments (iit-1) is positively 
correlated with total investments and highly significant, making clear that investment programs 
usually cover several years. On the other hand, the impact produced by the lag of capital stock 
(kit-1) on current investment efforts is negative, as is consistent with recent literature. This 
implies that total investments efforts tend to promote new infrastructure in provinces with lower 
stock endowment.  
Finally, note the importance of using a variable denoting the regional governments enjoying 
political powers on network modes. The highly significant coefficient associated with these 
cases confirms that central government reduces its investment efforts where powers have been 
transfered. 
Model 2 (network modes) and model 3 (no network modes) show that most Model 1 
(aggregate investment) results are driven by network modes. The model fit drops and there are 
several coefficients’ signs and statistical significance that change in Model 3 in comparison to 
model 1 and model 2. For instance, network mode’s investment programs are influenced by the 
centralization strategy of investing near to the political capital, while no-network modes’s 
investment effort appears to be positively related to distance. This means, as expected, that large 
ports and large airports can be found only far from the political capital. Being Madrid a city 
situated in the geographic center of Spain – unlike the most political capitals in Europe, which 
enjoy close access by water transportation modes- makes obvious the result for ports, although 
also in airports the transportation policy has avoid regional investments close to Madrid. This is 
the same to say that no relevant airports have been created to compete with the capital’s airport. 
This is confirmed by model 6 (airports) and model 7 (ports) for each no-network modes. 
The rest of policy variables provide mixed results as well. First, the variable of GDP per capita 
seems to be relevant in no-network modes while it appears positively correlated with network 
investments. Second, the variable Votes enjoys one of the only statistically significant 
coefficients of Model 3 (no network modes) when, at the same time, is not relevent across 
previous models. 
Significant differences can also be found in variables measuring mobility needs. Land area is 
associated with more network investment efforts, while in the case of no-network investments is 
the population the variable that appears relevant at 10%. Regarding the rest of variables we find 
that investment inertia’s coefficient is the only variable that shares the same sign and statistical 
significance in both network and no-network models, although its coefficient drops appreciably 
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when we just consider no network modes. Previous stock is not a driving determinant of 
investments in no-network efforts and being an island is only significant at 15%. 
Insert table 4 about here 
Finally, the results by transportation mode within network and no-network investments can be 
checked in the Appendix (Table A1). The results show that the road and port investments 
equations provide better model fit than rail and airport models. In fact, the lack of data regarding 
specific traffic by mode could be a reason of their weakness. All in all, we find that the distance 
to the political capital is still statistically significant in all cases except for airports, although its 
sign is positive for ports and negative for network modes consistently with results already 
presented. Again, the redistribution objective does not play any role in determining specific 
mode investment efforts. The electoral opportunistic strategy now arises as one important 
determinant of investment efforts in the case of roads, airports and ports. Interestingly, private 
investments in road transportation lead by toll motorway companies diminish public investment 
effort in regions having these private concessions. Also, islands seem to receive higher 
investment efforts for no-network – airports and ports – infrastructure than continental 
provinces, as was also expected. 
Concluding remarks 
The literature on determinants of regional allocation of infrastructure investment has shown 
that efficiency and redistribution are important drivers of the decisions made by the central 
governments regarding infrastructure investment. Besides this, political factors related to 
electoral strength and party alignment play a role as well. In addition to this, we claim that it 
shoul be paid more attention to factors related to wider meta-political objectives that the central 
government can follow by means of specific policies such as infrastructure investment.  
Our results regarding variables traditionally used in the literature (economic as well as 
political) are generally consistent with previous empirical evidence. Regarding our main 
empirical contribution, we find that investment in network modes is influenced by the 
centralization strategy of investing near to the political capital. On the contrary, investment 
effort in no-network modes appears to be positively related to distance. Since investment in 
surface transportation infrastructures is much higher than that in airports and ports, and taken 
into account that regions surrounding the political capitals are poorer than the average, we 
suggest that centralization rather than redistribution has been the driver for the concentration of 
public investment on these regions. 
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The Spanish case illustrates that centralization can be a main driver of the allocation of 
surface transportation infrastructure. And it could well be the case that, sometimes, we take as 
redistribution what really is connecting the capital-city (geographical center) with peripherical 
regions with infrastructures that happen to cross through less developed regions. Is it 
redistribution or centralization? 
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TABLES 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the empirical analysis (N = 1275) 
Variable Mean Value Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum value Maximum 
value 
itotal 0.041 0.03 0.00007 0.32 
inetwork 0.041 0.052 0 1.10 
ino-network 0.09 0.34 0 9.82 
kt-1total 3.14 2.46 0.24 16.22 
kt-1network 2.90 2.45 0.01 16.22 
kt-1no-network 0.24 0.38 0 2.88 
Distance_capital 426.53 320.81 0 1770 
GDP_per_capita 9,702.98 5,566.76 825.71 28,971.92 
Land 10,162.75 4,847.82 12.3 21,766 
Population 779,964.1 938,331.4 52,388 5,964,143 
Votes_Incumbent_Party 41.89 9.87 15 66 
 
Table 2. Correlation Matrix of the variables used in the empirical analysis (N=1150) 
 itotal inet. ino-net. kt-1tot. kt-1net. kt-1no-net Dist. GDPc Land Pop. Vot. 
itotal 1           
inetwork 0.98 1          
ino-network 0.01 -0.009 1         
kt-1total -0.07 -0.06 0.012 1        
kt-1network -0.07 -0.06 0.008 0.99 1       
kt-1no-network -0.04 -0.06 0.04 0.17 0.05 1      
Dist. -0.12 -0.14 0.07 -0.15 -0.21 0.47 1     
GDPc -0.06 -0.07 0.08 0.81 0.78 0.37 -0.003 1    
Land 0.19 0.22 -0.06 -0.04 0.007 -0.42 0.32 -0.19 1   
Pop. 0.11 0.06 0.06 -0.20 -0.24 0.24 0.10 0.11 -0.14 1  
Votes 0.17 0.18 0.02 -0.06 -0.05 -0.09 -0.06 -0.16 0.40 -0.03 1 
Note: In the computation of correlations, we exclude provinces that are located on islands.  
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Table 3. Investment equation estimates (2SLS) 
 Model 1: All modes Model 2: Network 
modes 
Model 3: No network 
modes 
Distance_capital -9.06e-06  
(2.37e-06)*** 
-0.000010 
(2.41e-06)*** 
0.00015 
(0.00008)* 
GDP_per_capita 6.37e-07 
(2.09e-07)*** 
5.73e-07  
(1.91e-07)*** 
0.000010 
(7.31e-06) 
Land 2.14e-07 
(1.33e-07)+ 
2.97e-07 
(1.35e-07)*** 
-4.06e-06 
(4.38e-06) 
Population 1.30e-10 
(4.56e-10) 
-3.23e-10 
(3.97e-10) 
1.42e-08 
(6.94e-09)* 
Votes- Incumbent_Party 0.00006 
(0.00008) 
0.00004 
(0.00009) 
0.0022 
(0.00069)*** 
iit-1 0.71 
(0.032)*** 
0.70  
(0.03)*** 
0.15 
(0.08)* 
kit-1 -0.0016 
(0.00039)*** 
-0.0015 
(0.00036)*** 
-0.069 
(0.06) 
Dforal -0.0085 
(0.0019)*** 
-0.009 
(0.001)*** 
- 
Disland - - 0.07 
(0.04)+ 
Time_trend -0.0001 
(0.0001) 
-0.00013 
(0.00019) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
Intercept 0.012 
(0.003)*** 
0.013 
(0.004)*** 
-0.08 
(0.04)* 
N 
R2 
F (joint sig.) 
Hansen Test 
F-test of excluded 
instruments  
1104 
0.56 
772.51*** 
0.12 
27885.30*** 
1104 
0.55 
1077.73*** 
0.003 
25995.74*** 
1112 
0.05 
20.04*** 
0.39 
23517.90*** 
Note 1: Standard errors in parenthesis (robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered by region) 
Note 2: Stastistical significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*), 15%(+) 
Note 3: Instruments for GDP per capita are the following: mean number of schooling years and first lag of 
GDP per capita.   
Note 4: Hansen Test: Ho is no overidentification of all instruments. Excluded instruments test: Ho is weak 
identification of all instruments. 
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Appendix 
Here we present the models used to estimate investment efforts by each transportation mode 
separately. Their results are also presented below. 
Model 4: iitroads  = α +β1Distance_capitali + β2GDP_per_capitait + β3Votesit + β4Popit + β5Landi 
+ β6iit-1roads + β7kit-1roads + β8Dforal + β9Time_trend + β10Dtoll_roads + β11Time_trend + ε  
Model 5: iitrail  = α +β1Distance_capitali + β2GDP_per_capitait + β3Votesit + β4Popit +β5Landi + 
β6iit-1rail + β7kit-1rail + β8Dforal + β9Time_trend + ε  
Model 6: iitairports = α +β1Distance_capitali + β2GDP_per_capitait + β3Votesit + β4Popit + β5Landi 
+ β6iit-1airports+ β7kit-1airports + β8Disland + β9Time_trend + ε  
Model 7: iitports = α +β1Distance_capitali + β2GDP_per_capitait + β3Votesit + β4Popit + β5Landi + 
β6iit-1ports + β7kit-1ports + β8Disland + β9Time_trend + ε  
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Table A1. Investment equation estimates (2SLS) 
 Model 4: Roads Model 5: Rail Model 3: Airports Model 4: Ports 
Distance_capital -9.12e-06 
(2.60e-06)*** 
-0.00004 
(0.00002)* 
0.000003 
(0.00004) 
0.00002 
(7.79e-06)*** 
GDP_per_capita 7.75e-08 
(2.44e-07) 
3.81e-06 
(2.63e-06) 
0.00001 
(7.83e-06)+ 
-1.75e-07 
(3.09e-07) 
Land 1.32e-07 
(1.37e-07) 
6.98e-07 
(8.67e-07) 
-1.80e-06 
(3.85e-06) 
-5.79e-07 
(2.49e-07) 
Population -1.69e-09 
(5.86e-09)*** 
2.60e-10 
(2.76e-09) 
1.61e-08 
(5.57e-09)*** 
2.26e-09 
(1.01e-09)** 
Votes- 
Incumbent_Party 
0.00008 
(0.00004)* 
0.00003 
(0.0006) 
0.0017 
(0.0006)** 
0.00021 
(0.00008)*** 
iit-1 0.68 
(0.018)*** 
0.51 
(0.09)*** 
0.15 
(0.07)** 
0.66 
(0.09)*** 
kit-1 -0.0019 
(0.0007)** 
-0.028 
(0.009)*** 
-0.25 
(0.18) 
0.008 
(0.002)** 
Dforal -0.009 
(0.001)*** 
-0.015 
(0.013) 
- - 
Disland - - 0.17 
(0.06)** 
-0.024 
(0.005)*** 
iprivate -0.0009*** 
(0.001) 
- - - 
Time_trend 7.97e-08 
(0.0002) 
-0.0007 
(0.026) 
-0.06 
(0.045) 
0.000029 
(0.00001) 
Intercept 0.015 
(0.0036)*** 
-0.0007 
(0.026) 
-0.06 
(0.04) 
-0.005 
(0.003)* 
N 
R2 
F (joint sig.) 
Sargan Test 
F-test of excluded 
instruments  
1104 
0.56 
1686.62*** 
0.001 
23378.66*** 
1104 
0.26 
66.30*** 
0.46 
30129.99*** 
1112 
0.04 
12.55*** 
0.31 
23012.17*** 
1112 
0.65 
104.94 
2.42 
23078.00*** 
Note 1: Standard errors in parenthesis (robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered by region) 
Note 2: Stastistical significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*), 15%(+) 
Note 3: Instruments for GDP per capita are the following: mean number of schooling years and first lag of 
GDP per capita.   
Note 4: Sargan Test: Ho is no overidentification of all instruments. Excluded instruments test: Ho is weak 
identification of all instruments. 
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